How might Brexit impact the UK energy industry? by Allan, Grant & Comerford, David
Allan, Grant and Comerford, David (2017) How might Brexit impact the 
UK energy industry? In: Scotland, the UK and Brexit. Luath Press 
Limited, Edinburgh. ISBN 9781912147182 , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/61491/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
How might Brexit impact the UK energy industry? 
 
Grant Allan and David Comerford 
Fraser of Allander Institute and Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
$UWLFOHQRZSXEOLVKHGDV&KDSWHULQ³6FRWODQGWKH8.DQG%UH[LW$JXLGHWRWKHIXWXUH´*
Hassan and R. Gunson (eds), Louth Press Limited, ISBN: 978192147182 
 
 
 
 
7KH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI%UH[LW IRU%ULWDLQ¶V HQHUJ\ IXWXUH ZDV QRW DQ LPSRUWDQWSRLQWRI
FRQWHQWLRQGXULQJWKHUHIHUHQGXPGHEDWH³EQYLURQPHQWDO´LVVXHVZHUHRnly identified 
as important in influencing their vote for 1% of individuals surveyed before the 
referendum vote (Ipsos Mori, 2016). Since the vote to leave, environmental and energy 
issues have remained outside the central focus of the debate. 
 
That being said, Brexit has the potential to have profound effects on both 
environmental and energy policy in the UK in the months and years ahead. As the 
debate moves on from the merits or demerits of the referendum outcome to the actual 
practicalities of WKHWHUPVRIWKH8.¶VH[LWDQGRXUIXWXUHHFRQRPLFUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
the EU, such issues are likely to gain significant attention.  
 
Allan (2016) says ³FULWLFDOWRDYRLGLQJDPRUHQHJDWLYHRXWFRPH>IURP%UH[LW@ZLOOEH
ensuring access to the internal energy market and the benefits of access and market 
integration that will help drive Scotland and the UK towards its long-term 
HQYLURQPHQWDODPELWLRQV´Here we outline developments since July 2016, and focus 
on items UDLVHGLQ)HEUXDU\¶VBrexit White Paper (UK Government, 2017).  
 
We can group these under two headings. Firstly, the UK government¶s vision of the 
energy and environmental policy trajectory, and secondly its vision of future 
participation in an integrated European energy market.  
 
1. Future Energy Policy 
The Brexit :KLWH3DSHUPDNHVFOHDUWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKH
Climate Change Act. New nuclear power, further decarbonisation of electricity through 
renewables and electricity storage, and electrification are all necessary to meet 
environmental obligations committed, and considerable investment will be required. 
7KH8.*RYHUQPHQWPDGHWKHGHFLVLRQWRSURFHHGZLWK+LQFNOH\3RLQW&VLQFH-XQH¶V
vote, and it was formally awarded a Contract for Difference in September 2016.) 
 
New generation capacity will continue to be built and the overall carbon consequences 
will depend on the technological mix. Investment decisions in the energy sector (worth 
a total of £100 billion over 15 years (HM Treasury, 2016)) will be taken in the next five 
years and will determine WKH SURILOH RI WKDW JHQHUDWLRQ IOHHW 1RYHPEHU¶V $XWXPQ
Statement saw no increase to the Contracts for Difference lifetimes, a consultation on 
the Levy Control Framework, and the confirmation of Carbon Price Support to 
2020/21. WLWKWKHVH³VWHDG\DVVKHJRHV´DFWLRQVLQWKHODVWIHZPRQWKV LW LVFOHDU
WKDWWKHGHWDLORI8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8ZLOOEHLPSRUWDQWIRUWKH8.HQHUJ\LQGXVWU\
and it is likely to have long-ODVWLQJFRQVHTXHQFHVRQWKH8.¶VHQHUJ\IXWXUH 
 
2. InteJUDWLRQZLWKWKH(8¶Venergy market 
TKHGHWDLORI8.¶Venergy exit from the EU will determine how the UK energy system 
links into the wider European energy landscape. These links are both physical and 
regulatory. ([LWLQJPHPEHUVKLSRIWKHYDULRXVUHJXODWRU\ERGLHVWKDWJRYHUQWKH(8¶V
internal energy market (IEM) is almost certain to remove any direct input for the UK in 
their governance and objectives. Being outside the IEM and its regulatory frameworks 
may then dilute the ability of the UK to finance and develop the development of the 
future physical infrastructure and networks that may underpin energy security. 
 A good example of the regulatory links that the UK currently has with the EU is its 
membership of the Euratom organisation. The White Paper makes an explicit 
reference to the UK leaving Euratom, as this organisation uses the EU institutions of 
the European Commission, Council of Ministers and the European Court of Justice. 
There are two key implications of the UK leaving Euratom. First, there is the need to 
replace and fund the inspection duties on existing nuclear generation and waste 
facilities. For instance, Froggatt (2017) writes that a quarter of time spent on nuclear 
inspections in the EU occurs within the UK. Second, the impact on the significant 
existing nuclear R&D activities in the UK funded by EU programmes. The UK Nuclear 
Industry Association has raised further concerns about ensuring transitional 
arrangements with EU member states and third countries (NIA, 2017). 
 
Another EU institution that the UK is currently party to, and which forms a key part of 
PHHWLQJ LWVHQYLURQPHQWDOJRDOV LV WKH(8¶V(PLVVLRQV7UDGLQJ6FKHPH(8(76 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2016). The EU ETS is a 'cap and trade' scheme which 
covers emissions from electricity generation and heavy industry, and which has the 
potential to be a least-cost approach, as firms with the lowest cost of carbon emissions 
reductions can make these changes, trading permits with firms who face higher costs 
of carbon emissions reductions. The quantity of permits in existence is reduced over 
time so that total emissions fall. The non-EU EEA countries are members of EU ETS, 
so perhaps the UK will not leave this organisation upon Brexit. If it were to leave EU 
ETS, then the UK could of course set up its own emissions trading scheme, but its 
reduced geographical scope would limit the universe of possibilities for low cost 
emissions reductions to be made by trading with players who face higher cost 
reductions. Additionally, setting up its own scheme will entail setup, administration and 
regulatory costs. On the other hand, the EU ETS has been subject to criticism, 
especially for over-allocation of permits and consequent low prices (which provide 
minimal incentives for emissions reductions), and an alternative UK scheme could 
learn from the mistakes of the EU ETS.    
 
The White Paper notes that the UK benefits through lower prices and improved 
VHFXULW\RIVXSSO\IURP³FRRUGLQDWHGHQHUJ\WUDGLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV´ZLWK(8PHPEHU
states through its current membership of the IEM. These arrangements consist of e.g. 
arbitrage opportunities for trading, a larger grid to support the balance of power flows, 
and the opening and extending of liberalised energy markets. A report for National 
Grid calculated that exclusion from the IEM could cost consumers up to £500 million 
per year (Vivid Economics, 2016). 
 
Recent figures show that net imports equate RIWKH8.¶VHQHUJ\VXSSO\PDNLQJ
it the twelve most import-dependent of the 28 EU member states (Eurostat, 2016), so 
physical connection to the IEM is vital for the UK energy needs and security of supply. 
Although currently a net importer of electricity through the existing interconnectors, the 
UK also has some of the best resources in Europe for variable renewables capacity. 
The viability of projects to develop these resources is enhanced the more the UK is 
DEOHWRH[SRUWVXUSOXVHOHFWULFLW\LQSHULRGVRIKLJKJHQHUDWLRQ7KH(8¶V,(0LVDEDVLV
for such an export market, and the EU is actively helping in the creation of the trans-
continental infrastructure required (see e.g. BBC, 2017).  The White Paper does state 
WKDWWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW³LVFRQVLGHULQJDOOWKHRSWLRQVIRUWKH8.¶VIXWXUHUHODWLRQVKLS
with the EU on energ\´ 8. *RYHUQPHQW  S  EXW Iundamentally, the 
economic benefits from interconnection between the UK and the EU may be weaker 
when there is uncertainty about the ability of generators and consumers on each side 
to trade via such links. 
 
In summary, whilst energy has yet to feature heavily in the Brexit debate thus far, the 
implications for investment, energy security and the future challenges and 
opportunities in operating outside existing EU regulatory structures mean that it is only 
a matter of time before some big decisions ± with significant consequences ± are likely 
to be required.  
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